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ABSTRACT Decentralized attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an efficient and flexible multi-authority
attribute-based encryption system, since it does not requires the central authority and does not need to
cooperate among the authorities for creating public parameters. Unfortunately, recent works show that
the reality of the privacy preserving and security in almost well-known decentralized key policy ABE
(KP-ABE) schemes are doubtful. How to construct a decentralized KP-ABEwith the privacy-preserving and
user collusion avoidance is still a challenging problem. Most recently, Y.Rahulamathavam et al. proposed
a decentralized KP ABE scheme to try avoiding user collusion and preserving the user’s privacy. However,
we exploit the vulnerability of their scheme in this paper at first and present a collusion attack on their
decentralized KP-ABE scheme. The attack shows the user collusion cannot be avoided. Subsequently, a new
privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE is proposed. The proposed scheme avoids the linear attacks at
present and achieves the user collusion avoidance. We also show that the security of the proposed scheme is
reduced to decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption. Finally, numerical experiments demonstrate the
efficiency and validity of the proposed scheme.
INDEX TERMS Decentralized attribute-based encryption, key policy, collusion attack, DBDH assumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to share data according to a policy without prior
knowledge of who will be receiving them, Sahai and
Waters extended identity-based encryption (IBE [1]–[3]) and
introduced the attribute-based encryption mechanism [4].
According to a policy over a set of attributes associated
with the generation of private keys or ciphertext, attribute-
based encryption is categorized into key-policy attribute-
based encryption (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). Most of all ABE pro-
posals are developed using single central authority which
generates private keys of the users and verifies all the
attributes or credentials it issued for each user (Fig. 1).
In a single authority attribute based encryption scheme
([5], [6]), a central authority (CA) can control all the data
and sensitive information of the users. In addition, the cen-
tral authority needs to communicate with each user, it is
a difficult task to manage numerous users’ attributes. The
single authority could become a common bottleneck. Chase
solve it and presented the multi-authority (MA) scheme
in [7], where there are multiple authorities responsible for
disjoint set of attributes (Fig. 2). However, her scheme also
needs a trusted central attribute authority for distributing
all the keys. If the CA is malicious, it can compromise
the ABE system. Then Chase and Chow further devel-
oped MA-ABE using a distributed PRF and showed the
CA was removed in [8]. To satisfy the simultaneous goals
of autonomous key generation and collusion resistance,
Lewko and Waters [9] proposed a new multi-authority ABE
named decentralized ABE (Fig. 3). Their scheme over-
comes the collusion vulnerability without any coordination
between attributes authorities (AAs) but does not preserve
the users’ privacy. Then Han et al. proposed a privacy pre-
serving decentralized KP-ABE scheme (DKP-ABE) in [10].
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FIGURE 1. Single central authority ABE scheme.
However, Ge et al. [11] pointed out that it did not resist
user collusion attack. Subsequently, a modified privacy-
preserving decentralized KP-ABE scheme was proposed
by Rahulamathavan et al. [12]. Rahulamathavan et al. [12]
declared their scheme mitigated the user collusion attack
employing anonymous key issuing protocol and achieved
user’s GID hidden. In this paper, we give a security analysis of
the scheme of Rahulamathavan et al at first. We observe that
their decentralized KP-ABE scheme has a bug in decryption
and shows how to fix it. Then we give an attack on their
scheme and show the proposed scheme cannot resist collusion
attacks. Finally, we propose our own scheme, which can resist
the collusion attack, and the security is based on the standard
security assumption (DBDH).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
the preliminaries used throughout this paper. In Section 3,
a brief review of the scheme of Y. Rahulamathavan et al and
the correctness analysis are developed. In Section 4, an attack
on their decentralized KP-ABE scheme is given. We present
the improved scheme in Section 5. The security analysis,
anonymous key issuing protocol and user collusion avoidance
are present in section 6, 7 and section 8. Then we show our
performance analysis in section 9. In Section 10, we conclude
the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, by x ∈R X , we denoted that x is randomly
selected from X , and by x ←R Zp, we denoted that x is
selected from Zp identically if Zp is a finite set. By A(x)→ y,
we denoted that y is computed by running algorithm A on
input x. Suppose that Zp is a finite field with prime order
p, by Zp[x], we denoted the polynomial ring on Zp, which
consists of all polynomials with coefficients from Zp.
A. BILINEAR MAPS
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p. Let g be a generator of G1 and e be a bilinear map,
e : G1 × G1 → G2. The bilinear map e has the following
properties:
• Bilinearity : For all g, h ∈ G1, and a, b ∈ Zp. we have
e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab.
FIGURE 2. Multi-authority ABE scheme.
FIGURE 3. Decentralized ABE scheme.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
• Computability: Group operation e(g, h) is efficiently
computable, where g, h ∈ G1
B. DECISIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN (DBDH)
ASSUMPTION
Let a, b, c, z ∈ Zp be chosen at random and g be
a generator of group G1. The DBDH assumption holds
when no polynomial-time algorithm B can distinguish the
tuple (A,B,C,Z ) = (ga, gb, gc, gabc) from the tuple
(A,B,C,Z ) = (ga, gb, gc, gz) with non-negligible advan-
tage. The advantage of algorithm B is
AdvDBDHB = |Pr[B(A,B,C, g
abc) = 1]
−Pr[B(A,B,C, gz) = 1]|.
C. ACCESS STRUCTURE
Let P = (P1,P2, · · · ,Pn) be n parties. A collection A ⊆
2{P} is monotonic if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C , then C ∈ A.
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An access structure (respectively monotonic access structure)
is a collection (respectively monotonic collection) A of the
non-empty subset of (P1,P2, · · · ,Pn). i.e., A ⊆ 2{P}\{∅}.
A set P is called an authorized set if P ∈ A, otherwise P is an
unauthorized set.
D. COMMITMENT
A commitment scheme allows someone to commit a chosen
value without leaking the value for a period of time and
reveal the committed value later when it is needed. There
are two properties in a commit scheme, binding and hiding.
Binding: once the value has been committed to, its owner will
not be able to change the value. Hiding: the value remains
unreleased until its owner reveals it later. The commitment
scheme used in our scheme is a perfectly hiding commitment
scheme as Pedersen commitment scheme [16]. This scheme
can be described as follows. Suppose that G is a cyclic group
with prime order p, and g0, g1, · · · , gk are generators of G.
To commit a tuple of messages (m1,m2, · · · ,mk ), the user




2 · · · g
mk
k . Then,
the user can use r to decommit the commitment R.
E. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF
In cryptography, a zero-knowledge proof or zero-knowledge
protocol is a method by which one party (the prover Peggy)
can prove to another party (the verifier Victor) that she knows
a value x, without conveying any information apart from
the fact that she knows the value x. The zero-knowledge
proof scheme involved in our construction is introduced by
Camenisch and Stadler [17].
F. OUTLINE OF DECENTRALIZED KP-ABE ENCRYPTION
A decentralized KP-ABE scheme consists of the following
five algorithms.
Global Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter l
as input and returns the system parameters params.
Authority Setup: The authority run this algorithm. Each
authority Ak generates his secret keys SKk , public keys PKk
and an access structure Ak , where k = 1, 2, . . . ,N .
Key Gen: Each authority Ak takes as input his secret key
SKk , a global identifier u (GID) and a set of attributes AkGID,
the key generation algorithm outputs a secret key SK ku for U.
Encryption: This algorithm takes as input the system
parameters params, a message M and a set of attributes Ac,
and outputs the ciphertext CT , where Ac = {A1c,A
2
c, . . . ,A
N
c }
and Akc = Ac
⋂
Ãk .
Decryption: This algorithm takes as input the global iden-
tifier GID, the secret keys {SK ku }k∈Ic and the ciphertext CT ,
and outputs the messageM , where Ic denoted the index set of
the authority Ak such that Akc 6= {∅}.
G. SECURITY MODEL
The security games are played between adversary and chal-
lenger as follows:
Initialization: The adversary A submits a set of attributes
Ac which he wants to be challenged and a list of corrupted
authorities CA, where |CA| < N . There should exist at least
one authority Ak such that Ac
⋂
Ãk /∈ Ak .
Global Setup: The challenger runs this algorithm to gen-
erate the system parameters params, and sends them to A.
Authority Setup: Each authority Ak generates his secret
keys SKk , public keys PKk and an access structure Ak , where
k = 1, 2, . . . ,N .
1. For Ak ∈ CA, the challenger sends the secret-public key
pair (SKk ,PKk ) to A.
2. For Ak /∈ CA, the challenger sends the public key PKk
to A.
Phase 1: The adversaryA can query secret keys for sets of
A∗GID, the only constraint is cannot meet the challenge access
structure AC .
Challenge: The Adversary submits two messages m0 and
m1 with equal length. The challenger flips an unbiased coin
with {0,1}, and obtain b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the challenger
computes CT ∗ = Encryption(params,mb,Ac) and sends
CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2: The Adversary is allowed to make more secret
key queries as phase 1.
Guess: Now, the adversary A output his guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversaryA in this game is defined as
Pr[b′ = b]− 12 .
III. REVIEW OF ‘‘PRIVACY-PRESERVING DECENTRALIZED
KEY-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION’’ OF
Y.RAHULAMATHAVAN et al.
In this section, we give a brief review of the scheme of
Y. Rahulamathavan et al. [12].
A. DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED
ENCRYPTION
In a Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme, the secret key is
associated with an access structure (policy), while the cipher-
text is labeled with a set of attributes ([13], [14]).
In a DKP-ABE system, multiple authorities can work inde-
pendently without any cooperation with each other, any party
can issue private keys to users. The ciphertext is generated
under some attributes which authorized users need satisfied.
A user obtains private keys from different authorities and
is able to decrypt the ciphertexts if his attributes match the
attributes specified in the ciphertext.
B. REVIEW OF THE SCHEME
There are n AA which are denoted as A1, · · · ,An. The
attribute set managed by the authority Ak is denoted as Ãk =
(ak,1, · · · , ak,nk ),∀k . The original algorithm in [12] works as
follows.
Initially, for a given security parameter λ, global setup
algorithm (GS) generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2
with prime order p, i.e, {G1,G2} ← (GS)(1λ). AA
setup algorithm (AS) is executed by each AA to randomly
generate public keys (PK) and the corresponding secret
key (SK). The public-secret key pairs for Ak is given as
{(Yk ,Zk , [Tk,1, · · · · ,Tk,nk ]), (αk , βk , [tk,1, · · · , tk,nk ])}.
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Global Setup(GS) - For a given security parameter λ,
(GS) generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with prime
order p as follows: {G1,G2} ← (GS)(1λ). Let e: G1×G1→
G2 be a bilinear map and g, h and h1 be the generators of G1.
There are N number of authorities {A1, · · · ,AN }.Ak monitors
nk attributes. i.e Ãk = (ak,1, · · · , ak,nk ),∀k .
AAs Setup(AS) - Secret keys of Ak : SKk = {αk , βk ,
[tk,1, · · · , tk,nk ]} ← Zp. Public keys of Ak : PKk = {Yk =
e(g, g)αk ,Zk = gβk , [Tk,1 = gtk,1 , · · · ,Tk,nk = g
tk,nk ]},∀k .
Each Ak specifies a (kk , nk ) threshold access structure where
kk ≤ nk . We consider more generic tree access structure.
Hence we replace the threshold access structure into a tree
based as follows: Ak specifies mk as minimum number of
attributes required to satisfy the access structure (mk ≤ nk ).
Key Generation(KG) - Attribute set of user is Ãu :
Ãu
⋂
Ãk = Ãku,∀k . Ak generates rk,u ∈R Zp and polynomial
qx for each node x (including the leaves T). For each node x,
the degree dx of the polynomial qx is dx = kx − 1 where
kx - threshold value of that node. Now for the root node
r , set qr (0) = rk,u. For any other node x, set qx(0) =
qparent(x)(index(x)). Now decryption keys for the user u are
generated as follows:














Encryption(E) - Attribute set for the message m is Ãm :
Ãm
⋂
Ãk = Ãkm,∀k . i.e. Ãm = {Ã1m, · · · , Ãkm, · · · , ÃNm}. Data
owner of message m randomly chooses s ∈R Zp, and output
the ciphertext as follows:
C : C1 = m
∏
k∈Ic








k,j},∀k ∈ Ic, ak,j ∈ Ã
j
m where Ic denotes the
index set of the authorities.
Decryption(D) - In order to decryptC , the user u computes




















. User then decrypts




C. A BUG IN THEIR SCHEME
1) ANALYSIS





















There must be a common k in gsβk and h
1






rk,u+u holds and the decryption will
be successful. Otherwise, the ciphertext cannot be properly
decrypted.
A Solution.We can replace C3 as follows:
C3 : C3,k = gsβk , k ∈ Ic.













Then, we can decrypt the ciphertext successfully.
2) CORRECTION
This scheme is correct as the follows equations hold. First,






























Then the user uses decryption key D
′

























m = {index(ak,j) : ak,j ∈ Ãkm})

























where qak,j(0) = qparent(ak,j)(index(ak,j)). Hence, Sk =
e(g, h1)
srk,u
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IV. AN ATTACK ON ‘‘DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY
ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME’’ OF
Y.RAHULAMATHAVAN et al.
According to the author’s analysis [12], their scheme is collu-
sion resistant. Unfortunately, based on [15], we find that their
original DKP-ABE scheme is not secure against collusion
attacks.
A. COLLUSION ATTACK ON DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY
ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
Without lose of generality, suppose there are three attribute
authorities, A1, A2, A3 in this system. Let Ai monitors
attributes {ai,1}. Hence according to the scheme presented in
section 3, the public keys and secret keys of Ai are PKi =
{Yi = e(g, g)αi ,Zi = gβi ,Ti,1 = gti,1} and SKi = {αi, βi, ti,1}
for i = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose the Encryption algorithm specifies
the attribute set for message m is Ãm = {a1,1, a2,1, a3,1}.
However, u1 only has attributes set Ãu1 = {a1,1, a2,1}. And
u2 only has attributes set Ãu2 = {a2,1, a3,1}. Now we use the
secret keys of u1 and u2 to decrypt the ciphertexts as follows:




































































C : C1 = m
∏
k∈Ic
e(g, g)sαk = me(g, g)s(α1+α2+α3);
C2 = gs;














compute X , Y , Sk as follows.
X = e(C2,D1,u1 )e(C2,D2,u1 )e(C2,D3,u2 )



















































m and polynomial interpo-



















































































Hence, the collusion attack has been carried out success-
fully, that is to say, suppose the ciphertext is associated with
attributes ai,j, a group of unauthorized users (none of their
attributes satisfies all ai,j) are able to access the encrypted
data successfully, as long as they could obtain the completely
secret keys of Ãkm individually, and ultimatelymake all of their
attributes meet the attributes required in the ciphertext. Thus,
the DKP-ABE scheme of Rahulamathavam et al. [12] fails to
meet the security requirement of collusion resistance.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Based on the scheme [12], we will make the following
changes to the user’s key.







1 , ∀ak,j ∈ Ã
k
u
The specific scheme is given as follows:
Global Setup(GS) - Take a security parameter λ as input,
this algorithm outputs the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with
prime order p. Let g, h and h1 be generators of the group G1
and e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear map. There are N
number of authorities {A1, · · · ,AN } and Ak monitors a set of
attribute Ãk = (ak,1, · · · , ak,nk ),∀k .
AAs Setup(AS) - Each authority Ak chooses
{αk , βk , tk,1, · · · , tk,nk } randomly from Zp. Then Ak cal-
culates PKk = {Yk = e(g, g)αk ,Zk = gβk , [Tk,1 =
gtk,1 , · · · ,Tk,nk = g
tk,nk ]},∀k . The master secret key of Ak is
set as SKk = {αk , βk , tk,1, · · · , tk,nk }. We use the tree access
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structure. Ak sets mk as a minimum number of attributes,
which authorized user needs to satisfy(mk ≤ nk ).
Key Generation(KG) - Ãku denotes the attribute set of
user u, which is monitored by authority Ak and Ãu
⋂
Ãk =
Ãku,∀k . Ak picks rk,u ∈R Zp and generates polynomial qx
for each node x (including the leaves T). For each node x,
the degree dx of the polynomial qx is dx = kx − 1 where
kx is the threshold value of that node. For the root node r ,
we set qr (0) = rk,u, and for other node x, set qx(0) =
qparent(x)(index(x)). Then, the secret key of user is computed
as follows:







1 , ∀ak,j ∈ Ã
k
u
Encryption(E) - The data owner encrypts the mes-
sage m using attribute set Ãm : Ãm
⋂
Ãk = Ãkm,∀k
and Ãm = {̃A1m, · · · , Ã
k
m, · · · , Ã
N
m}. Then, he chooses
a random number s and calculates the ciphertext as
follows:
C : C1 = m
∏
k∈Ic








k,j},∀k ∈ Ic, ak,j ∈ Ã
j
m where Ic denotes the
index set of the authorities.
Decryption(D) - In order to decryptC , the user u computes



















. The user then




Correctness: The correctness of the decryption is given as
follows:
The user can first calculate his private key componentD′ =















e(g, g)−sαk e(g, h)usβk e(g, h1)
srk,u
βk+u ,


































































Theorem 1: The proposed scheme is secure in the selective
model if the DBDH assumption holds.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary A who can
break the proposed scheme with the advantage ε, then we
will show there is a simulator B who can break the DBDH
assumption by using the adversary with the same advantage.
Initially, the adversaryA submits a list of corrupted AAs as
CA and a set of AAs that he wants to challenge as Ãc, where
Ãc = {̃A1c, · · · , Ã
k






Ãk ). Suppose that
there is at least one honest AA (κ for short) in the security
game, where each user or the adversary cannot get sufficient
decryption key.
Note that the whole proof of the proposed scheme is similar
to that in [12]. In the proof of security, we only make simple
changes to the simulation of Dk,w and remove the D′k,w. For







Dk,w = g−bvkg(a+γ )wβkg
aηrk,w
βk+w
and remove the D′k,w.
























and remove D′k,w similarly.
The specific simulation process is as follows:
Golbe Setup: B selects γ, η ←R Zp, and sets h = gagγ ,
h1 = ga
η
= gaη. Then, B sends PP = (g, h, h1,G1,G2) toA.
Authority Setup:
1) For the corrupted AAs Ak ∈ CA, B chooses vk , βk ,wk,j
randomly from Zp and computes Yk = e(g, g)vk , Zk =
gβk , and {Tk,j = gwk,j}ak,j∈Ãk . Hence the public-secret
key pairs for Ak ∈ CA are shown as
{vk , βk , (wk,1,wk,2, · · · ,wk,nk )},
(Yk ,Zk , [Tk,1, · · · ,Tk,nk ]).
B sends the secret-public key pairs to adversary.
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2) For AAs who are not corrupted and not κ , B selects
vk , βk ,wk,j ←R Zp and sets Yk = e(g, g)bvk ,Zk =
gβk , {Tk,j = gwk,j}ak,j∈Ãc
⋂
Ãk or {Tk,j = h
wk,j
1 =
gaηwk,j}ak,j∈Ãk−Ãkc . The public-secret keys pairs are
{bvk , βk , (wk,1,wk,2, · · · ,wk,nk )},
(Yk ,Zk , [Tk,1, · · · ,Tk,nk ]).
B sends public keys to the adversary.
3) For Ak = κ , B chooses βk ,wk,j randomly










vk ), Zk = gβk . For the
attributes ak,j ∈ ÃC
⋂




aηwk,j for the attributes ak,j ∈ Ãk − Ãkc .









vk ), βk ,wk,1, · · · ,wk,nk },
(Yk ,Zk ,Tk,1, · · · ,Tk,nk ).
B sends public keys to the adversary.
Phase1: The adversary A issues a query of the secret keys
for global identifies wwith a set of attributes Aw, where Ac 6⊆
Aw.
1) For Ak ∈ CA,A can generateDk,w andDjk,w by himself
directly.
2) For the AAs who are not corrupted and not κ(Ak /∈
{CA ∪ κ}), Ak assigns a polynomial qx with degrees dx
for every node in its access tree T k . Firstly, it set up a
polynomial qx of degree dx for the root node x where
qx(0) = rk,w. It sets polynomials for each child node x ′
of x as qx ′ (0) = qx(index(x ′)). Then calculates Dk,w =
g−bvkg(a+γ )wβkg
aηrk,w












Ãk − Ãkc .
3) For Ak = κ , it can also generate Dk,w and D
j
k,w easily
based on [12]. In fact, since T k (̃Akc
⋂
Ãkw) = 0, it should
be stressed that maximum dx−1 number of children of
node x could be satisfied. It first defines a polynomial
qx of degree dx for the root node x, such that qx(0) = r ′.
For each satisfied child x ′ of x, it chooses a random
point ex ′ and set qx(index(x ′)) = ex ′ . Then we define
remaining children nodes using polynomial interpola-
tion. For each node x ′ of x, qx ′ (0) = qx(index(x ′)).
Dk,w and D
j








































































where ∀ak,j ∈ ÃC
⋂
Ãk .
Challenge: In this phase, the adversary A will submit
two messages m0 and m1 with the same length to B. Then
the challenger B randomly chooses one of the messages
and encryption it and sends the ciphertexts back to A. The
correspond ciphertexts are set as follow: C = {C1 =
mbZ ,C2 = gc,C3 =
∏
k∈AC
(gc)βk ,Ck,j} and Ck,j = (gc)wk,j ,
∀k ∈ Ac, ak,j ∈ Ã
j
m.
Phase2: The adversary continues with adaptive key
inquiries as phase 1.
Guess: The adversary A outputs his guess b′ of b.
If Z = e(g, g)abc, then C is a valid encryption of the
messagemb. Otherwise, Z is a random element ofG2, then C
is just random value ofG2. If b′ = b thenB outputs 1meaning
Z = e(g, g)abc. Otherwise, it outputs 0 meaning Z is random
in G2.
When the input tuple is sampled from BDH tuple (T ,Z )
(where T = (A,B,C),Z = e(g, g)abc), then A’s view is
identical to its view in a real attack game and therefore A
satisfies |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| ≥ ε. When the input tuple is not
sampled from BDH tuple (T ,Z ) (where Z is uniform in G2)
then Pr[b = b′] = 1/2. Therefore, we have that
AdvDBDHB = |Pr[B(T , g








VII. ANONYMOUS KEY ISSUING PROTOCOL
To obtain the decryption credential blindly from Ak ,∀k ,
the user needs to prove (to AA) that he owns u. As shown
above, user selects ρ1, z ∈R Zp and computes ψ1 =
guρ1
∧
ψ2 = gρ1 as commitment. Then authority AA chooses
ρ2 ∈R Zp. The two-party protocol (2PC protocol) takes
(u, ρ1) from the user and (ρ2, βk ) from AA, and returns η =
(u + βk )ρ1ρ2 mode p to AA. The specific operations of the
protocol are given as follows:
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1) The user u chooses z1, z2, z3 ∈ Zp, and computes T =
gzhu,P = hρ11 ,T
′
= gz1hz3 ,P′ = hz31 . The user u sends
(T ,T ′,P,P′) to AA.
2) AA chooses c←R Zp, and sends c to the user u.
3) The user u calculates s1 = z1 − cz, s2 = z2 − cu, s3 =
z3 − cρ1, and sends s1, s2, s3 to AA.
4) AA checks T ′ ? gs1hs2T c, P′ ? hs31 P
c. If they are cor-
rectly verified, then AA continues otherwise it aborts.
Then AA verifies gη2 = ψρ2rk,u2 ψ
ρ2
1 . If it’s correctly
verified then the AA continues otherwise it aborts. Now,
AA needs to prove that he knows (αk , βk , rk , r ′k , ρ2) in zero
knowledge to the user.
1) AA randomly generates b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 and com-






2 , D̃k,u =















k,u to the user.
2) The user chooses c1 ∈R Zp, and sends it to AA.
3) AA calculates b′1 = b1 − c1αk , b
′
2 = b2 − c1βk , b
′
3 =




5 = b5−c1ρ2, and sends
them to the user.






















ρ1 , where Zk = gβk belongs to PK .
Theorem 2: The proposed anonymous key issuing protocol
is both leakfree and selective-failure blind.
We ignored the proofs of both leak-free and selective-
failure blind for the proposed anonymous key issuing proto-
col since they are similar with those in [10,12].
VIII. USER COLLUSION
We use two methods which have been used to verify that the
proposed solution can resist collusion attacks.
A. AN ATTACK BY USING Dk,u OF DIFFERENT USERS WITH
A LINEAR RELATIONSHIP
Let us recall this attack at first. Rahulamathavan et al. [12]
show that the scheme in [10] under this attack cannot achieve
users collusion avoidance. Assume there two different users
U1 and U2 with identifier u1 and u2 which satisfy the tree
access structure respectively. Let U1 and U2 have the same
attribute setAiu1 = A
i
u2 at the authorityAi. Then, we show how
to produce secret keys associatedwith attribute setAiu3 = A
i
u2 .
The specific process is run as follows:
D1,u1 = g




αhr1,u2hu2β11 , D2,1 = h
r1,u2
t1,1
U1 andU2 can collude to compute the secret key correspond-
ing to the user U3 as follows:




























Note that D1,u3 and D3,1 are valid credentials for U3 for




) are correctly produced in the
credentials D1,u3 and D3,1 due to the collusion.




)γ , then the power of generator h becomes u1β1+










), where γ can be any scalar (i.e. u3−u1u2−u1 ).
Considering the power of h1, one cannot remove the u1
and u2 since it is coupled non-linearly with r1,u1 , r1,u2 and β1,
which are known only toAA, i.e. u1 and u2 cannot be replaced
with u3. Therefore, this attack is invalid for our scheme.
B. SECOND ATTACK: THE PROPOSED ATTACK USED IN
SECTION 4
The secret keys of users u1 and u2 are given respectively as
follows :
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and D′u1 = h
u1 .






















and D′u2 = h
u2 .
The ciphertext corresponding to the encrypted messageM

















stk,j , where j = 1, k ∈ Ic = {1, 2, 3}.
Hence,
X = e(C2,D1,u1 )e(C2,D2,u1 )e(C2,D3,u2 )


















u2 ) = e(g, h)
u2s(β1+β2+β3).




m and polynomial interpo-
























One can find e(g, h)su1(β1+β2)+sβ3u3 , the component of X ,
cannot be generated by u1 and u2. The attack of section 4 is
invalid to the proposed scheme.
IX. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will give some comparisons of the pro-
posed scheme with the scheme of Y. Rahulamathavam et al.
Some are shown in the Table 1. From the Table 1, one can
obtain the key size, ciphertext size are shorter than those in
scheme [12]. In the decryption phase, we have lower compu-
tation cost than that in [12]. Additionally, it is very significant
that the proposed scheme meets the security requirement
(collusion avoidance). In table 1, K is the number of AAs and
N denotes the number of attributes. |G1| and |G2| denote the
number of bits for the representation of elements of G1 and
G2. E is the exponential computation. Subsequently, we set
FIGURE 4. Total encryption cost for data owner.
FIGURE 5. Total decryption cost for users.
k = 10. The simulation is accomplished on a Windows
machine with 3.40GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-3240 CPU and
4GB ROM. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show that the proposed scheme
is better than scheme [12] in Encryption and Decryption cost.
Based on the Table 1, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the proposed scheme
is more practical than the scheme in [12].
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss how to built the securely decentral-
ized KP-ABE. Based on a security analysis of the scheme
of Y. Rahulamathavam et al, we propose an improvement
scheme and show that the scheme can resist collusion attacks
existing in the recent works. The security of the proposed
scheme is reduced to the standard complexity assumption–
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
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